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Does state capacity lead to markets or do 
markets lead to state capacity? This is a 
fundamental—and yet still poorly under-
stood—question in political economy. We 
all agree that late-developing economies 
require state capacity in order to promote 
markets. State capacity encompasses the 
capacity to formulate and implement co-
herent economic policies, collect taxes, 
redistribute resources, and obtain social 
compliance with state agendas. Yet most 
of us will agree that the acquisition of 
state capacity is also dependent on the 
level of economic wealth. Although poor 
countries would like to achieve state 
capacity, they are severely constrained 
when it comes to building effective 
bureaucracies, eradicating petty corrup-
tion, enforcing law and order, gathering 
information, and so forth. 
Despite the obvious reality that state 
capacity and economic growth are inex-
tricably intertwined, their endogenous 
relationship has been largely neglected. 
Instead, dominant theories posit that 
either effective governance or growth 
comes first in development. Aligned with 
modernization theory, some believe that 
wealth precedes state capacity, and good 
institutions like democratic mechanisms 
of accountability will blossom once so-
cieties become rich (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005). Others, in particular the World 
Bank and Western policy-makers, assert 
that late developers must first establish 
the norms of good governance and rule 
of law (whatever it means) before they 
are capable of achieving growth (Kauf-
mann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999). 
Following a path-dependent logic, a 
third school traces the origins of state 
capacity to colonial legacies (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012; Kohli, 2004). This 
school argues that nations that currently 
boast stronger state capacity than others 
enjoyed better histories. 
A core limitation of the existing 
schools of thought is that each captures 
only one slice of the grand, dynamic pic-
ture of development. Indeed, increased 
levels of wealth will empower political 
and institutional change. Additionally, 
modern state capacities are necessary 
for capitalist markets to flourish. And 
yes, history may cast a long shadow on 
the present. However, those who argue 
that markets lead to state capacity do 
not specify the origins of markets. Those 
who point the causal arrow in the oppo-
site direction cannot explain how state 
capacities emerge. Finally, those who 
spotlight history verge on determinism 
and struggle to explain instances when 
societies radically break from their past 
and forge new paths—as vividly illus-
trated by China’s experience during the 
reform era. 
In my forthcoming book, How 
China Escaped the Poverty Trap, to be 
published by Cornell University Press 
(Cornell Studies in Political Economy), I 
propose a new way of thinking about the 
sources and dynamics of development—
one that views development as a funda-
mentally coevolutionary process. States 
and markets necessarily adapt to each 
other and coevolve. In different places 
and at different points in time, changes 
in market conditions push state reforms 
and vice versa in a coevolutionary causal 
chain. Once we place the coevolutionary 
relationship between state and market at 
the heart of our analysis, two new and 
challenging questions are raised: How ex-
actly does the economy and governance 
coevolve? What particular environmental 
features and strategies enable poor and 
backward societies to coevolve—in other 
words, to grow markets and to modernize 
governance simultaneously? 
China’s great transformation pres-
ents an important and particularly il-
luminating case to explore these central 
questions. As China specialists will 
readily attest, China did not “get gover-
nance right” in one bold sweep before 
achieving spectacular capitalist growth. 
Nor did Chinese reformers wait until 
there were sufficient financial resources 
before internally remolding the adminis-
tration. Many observers have described 
the Chinese state as remarkably adaptive 
and entrepreneurial. However, such abun-
dant descriptions of adaptability beg the 
question of why China appears to be ex-
ceptionally adaptive and why adaptation 
has worked so well, at least thus far. After 
all, the norm, especially in the developing 
world, is that governments either refuse 
or are unable to adapt. 
My book pursues two connected 
objectives. The first is to map the co-
evolution of the Chinese economy 
and its bureaucracy at the national and 
sub-national levels over three decades 
of reforms. State capacity encompasses 
multiple dimensions, and among them, I 
choose to focus on bureaucratic capac-
ity for a compelling reason. Capitalist 
markets can thrive in both authoritarian 
and democratic regimes, but they cer-
tainly cannot flourish in the presence of 
a patrimonial, corrupt bureaucracy that 
arbitrarily preys on business and that is 
incapable of executing state policies (Ev-
ans, 1995). By systematically mapping 
the changes that unfolded in the economy 
and the bureaucracy in different parts of 
China over the past decades, this exer-
cise reveals new insights that challenge 
conventional wisdoms. Two insights are 
highlighted below. 
1.  The package of institutions—both 
economic and bureaucratic—that 
propel early growth stages is quali-
tatively different from the standard 
package of good institutions that 
support mature capitalist markets. 
Acemoglu and Robinson are cor-
rect to argue that non-extractive 
and inclusive institutions, such as 
the formal protection of property 
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dismissed as either backward or corrupt, 
we are unable to appreciate—much less 
activate—their developmental potential. 
In other words, how we interpret what 
people do is not a frivolous, low-stakes 
exercise of subjective judgment. Rather, 
it has significant theoretical and policy 
implications. 
The lessons of China’s escape from 
poverty have far-reaching relevance for 
other developing countries. They inform 
pressing challenges facing the United 
States to lift poor and weak states, such 
as Afghanistan, out of poverty traps. By 
recognizing the normative assumptions 
implicit in conventional wisdom and 
then setting these assumptions aside 
and by embracing development as a 
dynamic rather than as a linear process, 
there is much promise to innovate new 
and localized methods of promoting 
development. 
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rights and a level economic playing 
field, are conducive to development. 
But this is only the case during late 
growth stages. Whether in China, 
early modern Europe, or the United 
States, the take-off of development 
was propelled by institutions that 
we normally regard as backward or 
corrupt. 
2.  Political elites, whether at the na-
tional or sub-national levels, do not 
in fact have fixed preferences that we 
know a priori and from which we can 
infer predictable decisions. China’s 
national leaders often do not know 
what specific outcomes they envision 
or prefer, choosing instead to issue 
deliberately vague directives to local 
agents. Meanwhile, in the localities, 
the leaders’ particular preferences 
for types of economic policies and 
bureaucratic practices evolve over 
time in response to changing market 
conditions. The goals and prefer-
ences of elites are often altered by 
the unexpected consequences of 
their prior decisions. 
The coevolutionary paths of development 
revealed in my study trigger a deeper 
question: What are the environmental 
features in China that enabled a coevo-
lutionary process of radical change? 
How and by whom were these features 
created? I argue that China achieved 
its extraordinary makeover through an 
adaptive approach that I call directed 
improvisation. This system is distinct 
from “plan-ideology” under Mao and 
“plan-rationality” in the East Asian de-
velopmental states, labels employed by 
Chalmers Johnson (1982) to characterize 
the two contrasting political economies. 
In these archetypes, “plan” refers to the 
enactment of specific policies or institu-
tions believed to bring about national 
prosperity. In both instances, the state 
assumes it knows what will work. 
Under directed improvisation, the 
national government does not engineer 
specific planned outcomes, but instead 
it establishes a platform that empowers 
local agents to improvise solutions and 
to implement central goals according to 
changing and diverse circumstances. As 
suggested by complexity frameworks 
(Axelrod & Cohen, 1999), the creation of 
an effective platform involves addressing 
three generic problems of adaptation: 
how to influence the range of possible 
solutions (variation); how to clearly 
define and reward success among agents 
(selection); and how to turn inequality of 
resources across units into a collective 
advantage (niche creation). As I argue, 
the directed improvisation approach has 
not only enabled China to escape the 
poverty trap, but it has also produced 
a distinctively broad, bold, and uneven 
pattern of transformation, with conse-
quences that will reverberate well into 
the twenty-first century.
In combination, the insights in 
my book suggest an urgent need to re-
think some core assumptions that have 
guided both development theories and 
practices. For decades, building state 
capacity, or “getting governance right,” 
has meant replicating particular institu-
tional forms—primarily those found in 
capitalist democracies—that are believed 
to pave the way for markets: Weberian 
bureaucracies, impartial courts, formal 
protection of property rights, and so on. 
In contrast, my study calls attention to 
the creation of meta-institutions that 
foster adaptive processes, which in turn 
can produce diverse and changing insti-
tutional forms, whose exact shape cannot 
be fully predicted in advance. 
More specifically, my study under-
scores our gap in knowledge about the 
variety of institutions that can potentially 
kick-start development. These are quali-
tatively different from those institutions 
known to sustain development. Almost 
invariably, the former set of institutions 
builds on pre-existing informal and 
traditional practices, such as personal 
connections, clan-based ties, and reli-
gion. However, when these practices are 
